Thirteenth Distinction Single Question

Whether the Holy Spirit is generated, or whether the Production of the Holy Spirit is Generation or is Distinct from it

1. About the thirteenth distinction I ask whether the Holy Spirit is generated, or whether the production of the Holy Spirit is generation or is distinct from it.

Proof that it is generation:

Because generation in creatures is distinguished from other changes by the fact that it is change to substance, or by the fact that by it something is produced in the being of substance; the Holy Spirit is, by inspiriting, produced in divine being, just as by filiation or generation the Son is produced; therefore the production of the Holy Spirit is generation. - A confirmation of the reason is that changes and motions are distinguished by their formal terms, according to the Philosopher Physics 5.1.224b7-10; but the formal term of the inspiriting of the Holy Spirit is the same as the formal term of generation, because the essence is communicated to both; therefore inspiriting is generation.

2. Further, things that are the same as one and the same thing are the same as each other, therefore things that are univocal with one and the same thing are univocal with each other; generation and inspiriting are univocal productions when compared to the same third thing, as to the Father, because it was said above in distinction 7 that both productions are univocal in themselves [I d.7 n.42]; therefore they are productions univocal with themselves, and so they are of one and the same idea.

3. Further, a real difference does not depend on a difference of reason, because a real difference is more perfect; but the difference between the principles of these productions - which are nature and will - is only a difference of reason, because a real difference between absolute things does not seem capable of standing with the divine simplicity; therefore the distinction between these productions, which pre-requires the distinction of principles, will be only one of reason.

4. The minor is also proved in another way, doubly:

First, because otherwise there will be a real relation, and so a real distinction, between the intellect and the act of understanding in God. The proof of the first consequence is that wherever the intellect is, by the nature of the thing, distinguished from the act of understanding, the intellect receives the act of understanding (or is the idea of receiving it), and so there will be there a relation of recipient to thing received; and there is a confirmation, because, if the intellect in God is not the idea of receiving the act of understanding, God will not be said to understand more properly with the intellect than with the will. Thus also can it be argued about the relation of ‘prior’, because the principle is prior to that with respect to which it is principle.

5. The proof, second, of the minor is that the intellect absolutely is the principle ‘by which’ with respect to intellection, both in eliciting it and in receiving it, and so the two will be unequal, because the one exceeds the other; therefore when the same thing is added on both sides, an infinite intellect will be the principle in this way with respect to an infinite act of understanding, and so there will be there a real relation.

6. On the contrary:

Augustine On the Trinity V ch.14 n.15 says that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son “not in some way born but in some way given.”

I. The Opinions of Others

7. There are here many suppositions and many modes in which these productions may be distinguished.

A. First Opinion

8. One way of supposing these productions are distinguished is by the formal terms that are the produced persons.

9. And this supposition is confirmed by the statement in the Physics 5.5.229a25-27, where motions are distinguished by the terms, as it seems, because there is a different term for a different motion; and although these productions are not motions or changes, they are yet as it were certain ways to persons; therefore they are distinguished by the persons.

10. On the contrary: the productions do not have ‘being’ through the terms, therefore not distinction either. - The antecedent is plain because the terms have being formally from them; the consequence I prove because being and distinction are got from the same thing.

11. Again, the statement of the Physics [ibid.] is to the opposite: for motions are not distinguished by the terms save because the terms in flux are of the same idea as the terminating terms; but here the flux is not of the same idea as the term, - and the way too, which is as it were a flux, is not at all of the same idea as the formal terms, because the formal term is the essence, the way or the production - which is a sort of way - is the relation.

B. Second Opinion

12. Another way of supposing these productions are distinguished is by the fact that one production is from one person and the other from two persons.

13. Against this is that, if the same thing is the formal principle of producing something, the principle of production will not be of a different idea because of its being in this supposit or in that, because whiteness in a stone and in a horse is a principle of making a change of the same idea in sight; so too, if the same whiteness were in two things and in one, it would be a principle of making a change of the same idea in sight. But these productions are distinguished in such a way that they are not of the same idea, therefore to this distinction another idea must be assigned than the unity or duality of the acting supposits.

14. Again, according to this way an infinite number of persons could be posited in divine reality; for a fourth person could be posited from the three, and a fifth from the four persons, nor would there be any idea of trinity in the divine persons if there was only a distinction through a unity, or plurality, of acting supposits, and there was no distinction through ideas of producing.

15. Again, every distinction is reduced to certain things primarily diverse, which things would be distinct if, per impossibile, they were separated from everything else, -    therefore this distinction is through some such things as would be distinct with everything else per impossibile left out and as would also be in themselves primarily diverse; the unity or plurality of acting supposits are not such things if there is not any other distinction in the principles of acting; therefore etc     . For when everything other than the unity or duality of supposits is removed, this unity or plurality do not seem to be the primary reason for distinguishing the productions.

C. Third Opinion

16. In another way it is posited that these productions are distinguished by the fact that one production goes along with another and with its opposite, such that the idea of the distinction of disparate relations is the distinction of opposite relations, namely insofar as one disparate relation is compatible with two other opposite relations - just as the force of inspiriting stands along with active and passive generation, and is therefore distinguished from each of them.Note by Scotus: “Godfrey of Fontaines Quodlibet VII q.4: ‘On the contrary [to the opinion of n.16]: essence stands along with opposites, therefore it is distinguished from both. - Response: essence is not opposed to anything from which the generator and the generated are really distinguished; the one inspiriting is thus opposed.’” ⁵

17. Against this [n.16] one can argue as against the preceding opinion [n.12]; for this opinion does not give a reason that there are not infinite numbers of persons, because a later relation may always stand with the prior opposite relations; further, there would not be a primary diversity between this production and that, because this production

[inspiriting] would exist along with one opposite, its own, while the other [active generation] does not stand with its own opposite [passive generation], and so this would not be the primary reason for distinction, because the primary idea of distinction is an idea of things primarily distinct.

18. Against this way and the other preceding one I argue together as follows:

I ask why active inspiriting can stand with active and with passive generation, and active generation cannot stand with passive generation? - There is no reason other than the distinction of active inspiriting from active generation. For this is why something is compossible or incompossible with something else, because it is such in itself and not conversely, because the truth of the negative is confirmed and founded on the truth of the affirmative; for that is why man is not an ass, because man is man, - On Interpretation 2.14.24b3 and Metaphysics 4.41008a16-18. So there is first some distinction between active generation and active inspiriting, because of which the former is incompossible with passive generation and the latter not, before there is this compossibility or incompossibility.     Therefore this compossibility and non-compossibility is not the first reason for the distinction of productions.

19. Further, these productions are distinguished by the fact that one exists by way of nature and the other by way of will; but this distinction of productions does not come precisely from the producing supposits, nor because one relation stands with one relation, and another with another, but the distinction is taken from the distinction of productive principles, which have opposites modes of being principle; therefore etc     .

20. The one who holds this opinion [n.16] replies that one of the productions exists by way and the other by way of will “not because one person is naturally produced and the other not,” but because one production is like natural production and the other is like voluntary production. For a natural agent produces without presupposing another production, and this speaking generally, although per accidens one natural agent presupposes another that produces prior to itself; for in this way the production of the Son is by way of nature, because it does not presuppose another production. For the production of will presupposes another production, namely the one which is by way of nature and intellect; and in this way the production of the Holy Spirit is by way of will, because the Holy Spirit is produced in a similar way to the production which is properly called the production of will, namely ‘by presupposing another distinction’.

21. This exposition [n.20] does not seem valid against the intention of the saints who attribute these productions properly to the intellect and the will; because if these productions must be understood to be distinguished by the fact that one of them presupposes another production while the other does not presuppose another production, there seems no reason that from these productions the Son should be more Son or Word -by force of his production - than the Holy Spirit, nor that the Holy Spirit should, by force of his production, be more love than the Son, which seems absurd.

22. Again, many other productions can be posited, whether with presupposition or without presupposition of another production - just as production by way of art seems to presuppose another production, namely the production of the inner word in the mind of the artist; therefore the Holy Spirit could be produced by way of art, which is false.

23. And there is proof, as was argued in distinctions 2 and 10 [I d.2 nn.75-88, 221-226, 300-303, d.10 nn.6-9], because, from the fact that in God there is properly intellect and will, and each of these is a sufficient productive principle along with the object when present to itself, one person is truly produced by act of intellect as productive principle, and another person is produced by act of will as productive principle - and not merely metaphorically, because of such an extrinsic likeness, namely ‘being produced when another production is presupposed or not presupposed’.

D. Fourth Opinion

24. In another way it is said that these emanations are distinguished by opposite relations, namely of prior and posterior, because one production is naturally prior to the other.

25. On the contrary. This distinction is not primary. For one must give some cause why one production is prior to the other; nor is there any reason other than that this production is of one sort and the other of another, whether on the part of the productive principles or on the part of the acting supposits.

26. Besides, a relation is not primarily and precisely distinguished from a relation by a relation, because a relation does not first have a reference; therefore, since these emanations are relations, they are not distinguished from each other first by other relations, namely relations of prior and posterior; and it is plain that these relations [sc. of prior and posterior] are different from relations of origin, because they are between different extremes, for the relation of origin is between producer and produced, but the relation of prior and posterior is between origin and origin.

E. Fifth Opinion

27. In another way it is said that these emanations are distinguished by the formal elicitive principles that are posited as the personal ideas of the agents, to wit the generative and inspiriting force.

28. But this was rejected in distinction 7 [I d.7 n.23], whether it is understood of the elicitive principle or of the terminative principle.

29. And in addition, how are these relations [sc. generative and inspiriting force] distinguished so that through them the opposite relations are distinguished [sc. passive generation and passive inspiriting]? For the latter seem less distinct than the former, that is, than their opposite relations, because the former can come together in the same person (to wit in the Father), while the latter cannot, because no one and the same person is produced in two ways; therefore it is more manifest that the latter emanations are distinct than that the former, that is their opposite relations, can be on the part of the productive principle. Therefore to assign a distinction to the latter through the former is to assign a more manifest difference or distinction through a less manifest distinction - and also not through intrinsic features, because relatives are not intrinsic to their correlatives.

F. Sixth Opinion

1. Exposition of the Opinion

30. In another way it is posited that they are distinguished by principles distinct in reason, namely by nature and will, which have to be principles of distinct emanations, -and yet these [sc. principle, nature, will] are not distinguished in the essence save by reason alone [sc. according to Henry], as was proved in the question ‘On attributes’ in distinction 8 [I d.8 nn.174-176].

2. Rejection of the Opinion

31. Against this: a real distinction does not necessarily require first a distinction of reason; but the distinction of these emanations for you necessarily requires first a distinction of elicitive principles; therefore if this distinction [sc. of emanations] is real, it is not distinct only through a distinction of reason alone [I d.8 n.177].

32. The major of this reason [n.31] is denied by some, and an instance is posited about ideas, which only differ in reason while creatures differ really, - and yet the real distinction of creatures necessarily presupposes a distinction of reason in the ideas.

33. There is an argument against this objection [n.32] - and first the major is proved [n.31], and second the instance [n.32] is excluded.

34. The major is proved according to this understanding, that a difference of reason in the cause will not be the proper reason for a real distinction in the effect.

[First proof of the major] - Because if it is [sc. if a difference of reason in the cause is the proper reason for a real difference in the effect], let the cause be a, and let the diverse reasons under which it causes be b and c; but let the things caused be d and e. Then as follows: if b and c are the proper reasons for a insofar as it causes d and e, then a is, insofar as it is under b, the proper cause of d, - for if not, ‘this difference’ is no more a distinct reason for causing than if the difference did not exist, because neither reason [sc. neither b nor c] is the proper cause appropriating this cause to this effect; anyone then who concedes that the cause, insofar as it is under b and c, causes d and e, has to concede that each reason is the proper reason of the cause with respect to its proper effect. But this consequent is false, that ‘a insofar as it is under b is the proper cause of d’, because a being, insofar as it is under b - which is only a being of reason -, has being only in the intellect, because a being of reason is not caused by the object save insofar as it is known, and it has, as such, being only in the intellect, because it is a diminished being, from Metaphysics 6.4.1027b25-1028a2. But nothing, insofar as it is a diminished being, is the proper reason of a true being and the proper cause of a perfect being; and the proof of this is that everything that causes a true being must have some being of existence, insofar as it is cause; but a diminished being, namely which is known being, does not have being of real existence; therefore neither can it, insofar as it is such, be the proper cause of any real being.

35. And if you say that although it does not have the being of existence, yet it does have the being of existence of the intellect in which it is, because it participates in the ‘being of the intellect’ insofar as it has being in the intellect, - on the contrary: from this it follows that no causation belongs to known being, insofar as it is such, save in virtue of the actual existence of the intellect itself, in which it has the being of actual existence in a certain respect; and then the will, further, will not be the principle of inspiriting save insofar as it participates the idea of the intellect, and then the divine intellect will be the reason of the inspiriting rather than the will; and thus it follows further that the intellect with respect to the generation of the Word will be a double principle, namely immediate, insofar as it is a productive principle, - and mediate insofar as it is the operative principle, through whose operation it has being insofar as it is productive, just as a known thing, insofar as it is known, has participated being in its knower. But if you do not attribute such real action to the existent intellect itself but to the object that has diminished being in the intellect, - it follows that there would be a real action of a thing that ‘is no less such than if it altogether did not exist’, for it is not repugnant to anything to be a known being although it have in itself no true and real being.

36. If it be said here that the divine intellect knows nothing here save intuitively, and thus that which has being known in the intellect - insofar as it is such - has the being of true existence, but it does not have such being as is being known in abstractive intellect or cognition (of which sort is my intellection of a rose that does not now exist, which is not intuitive intellection), - on the contrary: the reason that is posited as proper to a principle, insofar as it is a principle, is posited as being caused by an act of intellect in a known object; but the divine intellect causes nothing in the divine essence as it is existent (as they concede about the opposite opinion, that there is no difference there of reasons in the essence as it is existent but only as it is known), and it is per se plain, because whatever is in the essence as it is existent would exist in it if per impossibile there were no intellect busying itself about it.

37. [Second proof of the major] - Further, second: the divine essence, as it is in the Son and the Holy Spirit, naturally has some priority to the simple intellection of the essence; for just as the essence is of a nature ‘as it is in the Father’ to move the intellect of the Father to simple intellection of itself, so it is of a nature ‘as it is in the Son’ to move any intellect to simple intellection of itself, because according to Augustine On the Trinity XV ch.14 n.23 “the Father sees everything in the Son as in himself.” But if the essence ‘as it is in the Son’ has such priority as regard the simple intellection of itself, then ‘as it is in the Son’ it precedes every idea that the intellect can, by busying itself, construct about it; therefore no idea constructible about it naturally precedes it ‘as it is in the Son’, - otherwise there would be a circle in natural priority, because the reason too ‘that is caused by the intellect’ would naturally precede its being in the Son, and conversely.

38. If you say that the essence in the Father naturally precedes every reason producible about it, but that ‘as it is in the Son’ it follows some reason already produced in him by the act of the paternal intellect, - and then there is not a circle of the same thing to the same thing in accord with the same extremes, or in accord with the same existence or in accord with existence in the same thing, because the essence according to its existence follows in one supposit and precedes in another:

39 [Third proof of the major] - Against this response [n.38], I argue as follows: of one cause, in one order of causing, there is one per se reason of causing, - therefore much more in divine reality, where there is a primacy of being principle, must there be posited one reason per se of being principle; therefore the reason of being principle of the generation of the Word will be some one per se real reason. But thing and reason do not make a per se unity, because neither can any property consequent to a thing from the nature of the thing make a per se unity with the subject whose effect it is; therefore much more is this not so with a reason that is not consequent to the thing from the nature of the thing but is only consequent to it through an act of intellect. Therefore the second of these two [sc. the reason and the thing] will be precisely the principle ‘by which’ - by the Father himself - of the producing, and not the reason alone, because it is not formally infinite; the proof is that neither is a real relation formally an infinite perfection, because then some person in divine reality would not have formally all infinite perfection; therefore much more can a being of reason not be formally infinite and, consequently, not be the principle ‘by which’ of producing an infinite supposit; therefore the thing alone, to which this reason is attributed, will be the principle of producing the infinite supposit. But in whatever there is a principle ‘by which’ of some production, in that there is the principle of producing, if the supposit is suitable to such production; but the suitable supposit in divine reality for producing such a person in divine reality is something that does not have such nature by that production, nor by any production prior to it; such is the Father; therefore the thing alone will be for him the principle by which he produces, and in no way the reason.

40. [Fourth proof of the major] - Further, fourth: in divine reality that which is not formally the same as something is not truly the same as it unless either each is formally infinite, or one is, or at least each is truly the same as something formally infinite. But these reasons, which are posited as appropriating the productive principle of the two persons [nn.34, 30], are not formally the same, because then they would not be distinct reasons; nor are they truly the same as anything formally infinite, because then they would exist in that ‘formally infinite’ thing from the nature of the thing, as wisdom exists in the deity formally from the nature of the thing; nor is one or other of them formally infinite, as was proved in the preceding reason [n.39]. Therefore neither of them is truly the same as the other, in any way. Therefore in the way that both exist there, they are so truly distinct that they seem to stand in the way of supreme simplicity, whatever sort of entity is posited for them, because nothing can be posited there - according to any entity - which is not simply the same as the other, because of the simplicity of that essence.

41. [To the instance] - I exclude the instance [n.32], - first because it seems to be for the opposite; for if the distinction of creatures necessarily presupposes a distinction of ideas, and if for this reason God is under one idea the proper cause of one patterned thing [patterned after the idea], this would therefore be because a diminished being of God, namely known being, is simply more perfect and naturally prior to a perfect patterned thing, because patterned things are artificial things in respect of God, and the known being of an artificial thing, or the exemplar - in which the example or the artifact has being - is simply prior to the being of existence of the patterned thing. But this reason is altogether lacking in the divine persons, because the known being of essence cannot be naturally prior to the perfect being of the essence in itself; and therefore, although in the case of the artificial agent the first major were false [n.31] - for the proof of which four reasons have been posited [nn.34, 37, 39, 40] -, it would yet not be false in a natural production where there was communication of the same nature (as in the intended proposition), because there it does not seem that any known being could naturally precede the natural being of the nature.

42. Further, the instance assumes something false about the ideas, because the distinction of reason in God is not necessarily presupposed to the distinct patterned things, nor is God under the reasons of the ideas the proper cause of the diverse patterned things, as will be clear later in distinction 35 ‘On Ideas’ and in distinction 45 ‘On the Will’ [I d.35 q. un nn.5-10, d.45 q. un nn.2-3].

G. Seventh Opinion

43. There is another opinion [from Thomas of Sutton] relative to the question which posits that the essence under one reason, altogether indistinct, is the principle of these productions; because just as two limited things can be the principles of two acts, so the same unlimited thing, containing those two virtually in itself, can be the proper principle of the same acts, and under no reason of distinction in itself but only from its lack of limitation, as it is indistinct, - just as is plain about the single respect of many generable things in what is down here.

44. And the confirmation of this position is that the divine essence must be posited as having immediately wisdom and goodness, and to be in some way the root as it were and principle of these perfect attributes, and without any distinction in the essence itself, - otherwise there would be a process to infinity. So therefore the essence seems it can be posited as the immediate principle of the two personal productions.

45. Against this [n.44]:

The action of willing in us is not formally free but the will itself is formally free, because action itself is a certain quality and a certain natural form in itself, and is not something intellectual having an inclination to opposites; so the action is not free. Thus therefore in divine reality the production of the Holy Spirit - as already posited in being -does not seem to be formally free, because there seems precisely to be liberty in the principle of this production, insofar as it is of this sort. But if no distinction precedes the production of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, the first distinction which there is between this production and that is between them as they are posited in existence from that principle; therefore there is not one production in divine reality by way of intellect or nature and another by way of freedom, because no principle precedes what would be disposed differently toward this production than toward that, - and these productions, in which there is a first distinction, are altogether in themselves, as already posited in being, uniform in naturalness.

46. The assumption ‘about volition’ [n.45], although it could be proved in many modes or ways, can yet be made plain by the fact that, whatever volition generates, it generates naturally; hence appetitive habits are by virtue of acts of appetite as naturally generated from these acts as intellective habits are generated from intellections. It is also apparent from another fact, that then [if the assumption were not true] someone could formally rejoice and be sad freely, namely insofar as joy and sadness are properties consequent on willing and not willing, because the things that are immediate causes of those properties would be posited as formally free.

The consequent, however, ‘about properties’ seems to be sufficiently discordant, because being glad does not seem to be in the power of the will save because in its power is the ‘willing’ of that on which being glad is consequent - and so neither is being sad in its power save because in its power is the ‘not willing’ that on which being sad is consequent; and therefore someone who is sad about the happening of some harmful or disagreeable event, if he wishes to remove the sadness, must desist from not wanting what he did not want; but he is not at liberty to deliberate about this, that, while his not wanting and the event he does not want stay in place, sadness should not follow.

47. If this reason were conclusive [n.45], it would necessarily prove a distinction of intellect from will in the creature, and this a distinction in absolute realities on the part of the thing, which does not seem necessary; hence I reply that the same principle can have different relations to two products or two productions; but as it is freedom and naturalness do not essentially state an active principle but an aptitudinal relation of the principle to the product, and an aptitudinal non-relation - to wit, naturalness states a determination of itself of the first act to the second and third act, but freedom states a non-determination of this sort.

48. To the form [sc. of the reason, n.45]: I concede that neither posited act is free. Therefore freedom is in something preceding the act, as I agree, but not absolutely in it, but rather it states a respect of it to the act, - and naturalness likewise states another respect of the same preceding absolute thing to the other act. Likewise, in the case of the intended proposition, the response is easier, because the principle ‘by which’ seems to be naturally related (distinction 10 above, nn.20-21) to each production and product.

49. On the contrary: therefore in the ‘by which’ there is no distinction as it is ‘by which’ in respect of the production or the product save one of reason only, because it has no relation to the production or the product save one of reason only; again, freedom is an absolute condition, because it is a perfection simply (response: it gives one to understand perfection simply, but it only states a respect). - A corollary: therefore the whole deduction in distinction 2 about the primary duality of the active principles [I d.2 nn.300-303] is not valid save about relations that state a disposition of the active principle to the product; and it seems probable that there be a stand at something simply one, both in the productive principle ‘by which’ (although not ‘what’) and in the cause, because to be ‘by which’ belongs, for you [sc. Scotus] to perfection simply, just as to be a cause does.

50. Response: I concede that ‘freely’ and ‘naturally’ state a disposition, a determinate and a non-determinate disposition, to acting or to a term, but they establish a distinction in their foundations [sc. in will and in intellect]. And because it is a mark of ‘perfection simply’ to be an absolute thing by respect to what is posterior, therefore the principle to which belongs a greater absoluteness with respect to being a principle is simply more perfect than the principle to which belongs a greater determination with respect to being a principle, and this whether the things that are to depend on the principle are equally perfect or if the thing that depends on the principle of something absolute is more perfect than what depends on the principle of something natural, because in relation to an equally perfect posterior thing the more ‘absolute’ being is more perfect; therefore if our willing is not less perfect than our understanding, then from the respect of liberty in the will to willing, and of naturalness in the intellect to understanding, there follows on the will ‘the foundation of respect’ of being simply more perfect; this is in accord with the distinction of powers, on which see IV d.49 p.1 q.4 n.10.

51. But how is it in God?

The same thing seems to follow, that the Holy Spirit is as equally noble as the Son. Therefore the productive principle that is more absolute will be more perfect.

52. Response: each is infinite, both insofar as it is operative and insofar as it is productive.Note by Scotus: “Another way - in distinction 10 nn.18-19 - that infinite will is not more indeterminate for operation or production than the intellect.” ⁶ Therefore there is no excellence in the formalities, but only perhaps of reason, comparing infinite formalities to the finite ones with which they agree - and thus what agrees with the more perfect is conceived to have a certain reason of nobility, a reason that is a relation of reason to what is more noble.

53. To the argument [n.51]: the Holy Spirit and the Son are not posterior to the principles, nor are they more imperfect, but they are the same as them, - therefore absoluteness there does not argue perfection, nor determination imperfection, but only another way of producing.

54. On the contrary: at any rate in respect of creatures the intellect naturally understands, but the will freely wills; therefore with respect to them the will is more noble.

55. Response. This and that disposition [sc. naturally and freely] to first operations and products - if they were posterior - would prove the excellence of the foundation, but when the first operations and the first products are not posterior, but are the same or simply equal, the dispositions are of a different reason and are in different formalities, but without the excellence of one foundation in relation to the other. In whatever way the foundations may afterwards be compared - under these respects - to later operations and products which are simply posterior, no excellence of this foundation to that follows.

56. Note. A free power is a sufficiently active power, not determined of itself to operating about any object which is not finally perfective of it.

‘Active’ by action in the genus of action and from consequent operation; nor does ‘active operative’ suffice, because thus the intellect would be active although it is passive.

‘Sufficiently’ in its own order of acting; therefore it receives no act from another by which it may act in its order, because then it would be insufficiently active.

‘Not determined of itself’, that is of its own first act - and this in its order of causing (it follows from the corollary ‘sufficiently’) - and of the fact that it determines itself to acting; not indeed by any determination preceding the action in the genus of action, but it determines itself, that is, it is indeterminate from its own first act; yet it acts determinately, nothing else determining it to act.

57. This conclusion - thus expounded - is proved by the fact that whatever in its own order is sufficient for acting, if it is determined to act by another, it was already first determined to this in its own order or insofar as it was in its own order; for the fact it did not act was not because of defect of form or of determination on its part (but of the superior on which it depends) for acting, for operating; therefore it is operative and active. But freedom has per se more of a respect to action, at least more immediately; nor is it therefore determined to acting, but to some operation which is not about an object essentially perfective; but it is consistent with liberty that it be determined to operating about that object, and to acting - as a result - with respect to that operation; it was proved about the divine will with respect to God in distinction 10 [nn.41, 48], - here rather [sc. the proof is that] infinite liberty is necessarily determined.

58. But surely finite liberty is determined to operating about it [sc. an essentially perfective object]?

Response: liberty does not prevent that, as is plain about infinite liberty; nor does imperfection, as I prove because it is a mark of perfection to be determined to the perfective object, - it is plain about the will of God with respect to himself.

59. Therefore it belongs more to a more perfect thing to be determined with respect to a perfective object; the created will is more perfect than the created intellect, and the created intellect is necessarily determined to its perfective object, therefore the will is more thus determined (the opposite is held in distinction 1 question 4 [I d.1 nn.91-133, 136-140]).

60. Response: to determine oneself naturally to anything whatever is a mark of greater imperfection than not to determine oneself freely to a non-perfective object, because determination to what is non-perfective is a mark of imperfection; the intellect is necessarily determined to anything whatever, because it is determined naturally. And then to the proposition ‘it is a mark of perfection to be determined to a perfective object’: this is true when it is thus determined to that alone, and consequently not naturally [sc. but freely]; ‘therefore it belongs more to the more perfect’ is true, uniformly, because it belongs to the divine will and to no intellect.Note by the Vatican editors: “This is true but not in diverse way, as it is taken in the major [n.59] where two diverse things - intellect and will - are compared, but it is true in uniform way, namely by comparing either intellect to intellect or will to will; and thus it is true that it belongs more to the more perfect will, namely the divine will, which is more perfect than ours; but it does not belong to any intellect more, because any intellect is determined necessarily.” ⁷

61. But if from the greater perfection of the created will than of the created intellect [n.59] you at once infer that it is necessarily determined to its perfective object, this does not follow, because determination to the natural necessity which belongs to the intellect is repugnant to the will; but the other determination [sc. to the perfective object, as in the case of God nn.57-58] does not belong to the will from the perfection of the will in general but only to an infinite will. In another way: the intellect is necessarily determined by another; it is a mark of perfection that a thing not be so determined, and that, in determining itself, it necessarily determine itself to what is perfective, - and this belongs to the infinite will alone.

62. Whence is this indetermination of the [created] will?

Response. Not from the intellect, which is necessarily determined to anything whatever, although it can be impeded by a sophism (thus can a heavy object be impeded from falling); nay here, when it is determined by a sophism, it is necessarily determined, - in other ways by an opposite agent. The indetermination, therefore, is radically from the essence, but formally from the proper idea of the will. For because its nature is as it were unlimited, namely many things can be agreeable to it - therefore is given to it an unlimited appetite for agreeable objects and an apprehensive intellect, but determinately, according to determinate evidence for directing something; therefore further, so that as ‘undetermined to either’ it may be determined [sc. by itself].

63. Besides, second [nn.44, 45], if essence as altogether indistinct were the principle of the double production, then since the intellect under the idea of being infinite is a sufficient reason for producing the infinite word, and the will under the idea of being infinite is a productive principle of infinite love - and, before the infinite intellect and the divine will distinctly formally infinite are understood, the essence as essence is preunderstood - therefore through the essence, as it is pre-understood, there is a double intrinsic production; and when later the formally infinite intellect and the formally infinite will are there understood, there will be two infinite persons produced by virtue of those two principles; therefore there will be five produced persons.That is, the three persons before intellect and will are understood and two more afterwards (Son and Holy Spirit being, as it were, produced twice). The Vatican editors say otherwise: “namely two persons before the intellect and will, and three afterwards, because intellect and will are in the Father; cf. n.70.” ⁸

64. But if you say that there is never there infinite intellect and infinite will from the nature of the thing, but that there is only there the one nature altogether indistinct from the nature of the thing, and that from the idea of it there are the three persons there, and that intellect and will are there precisely through the consideration of the intellect and so these are not there principles, distinct from the nature of the thing, productive of real persons, - on the contrary:

If there are certain things distinct there by act of intellect, let them be a and b. Then I ask: either these are distinct from the nature of the thing, - and thus, you are contradicting yourself; if not, they are distinct by intellect, therefore the intellect under the idea of intellect distinguishes and not under the idea of nature. Either then the intellect is there under the idea of intellect before distinction of these things - and the intended proposition is obtained, because it is there from the nature of the thing; or it is not, but the intellect itself under the idea of intellect is there produced by act of intellect busying itself and doing the distinguishing, and then one would ask by what act this intellect is produced - either from the nature of the thing or from the intellect as intellect - and there will be a process to infinity, or wherever a stand is made the intellect will be there insofar as it is intellect and from the nature of the thing, or the first distinction that is placed there will be from the nature of the thing, the opposite of which you posit.

65. Further, God is formally blessed from the nature of the thing and not formally in relations of reason; but his beatitude formally consists in intellection and volition; therefore intellect and will - which are the principles of them - are there from the nature of the thing.

66. This reason is confirmed through the Philosopher Metaphysics 12.8.1074b17-21, who proves that “if God is not actually thinking there will be nothing honorable in him, - for he will be as if asleep;” therefore, according to Aristotle, God is not formally perfect in the nature of the thing unless intellect is formally there from the nature of the thing, because actual intellection formally cannot be understood without intellect formally.

67. Further, if the intellect is not formally there from the nature of the thing but in its foundation, then the intellect is not formally perfection simply, because it is not better to have it formally than not to have it; nay for you, it is not formally possessed in that essence, which is best, but only in an opposite way of possessing; therefore one cannot conclude that intellect is there ‘because it is a perfection simply’, but rather the opposite seems to follow. Why then does Anselm say in Monologion ch.15, that whatever is in God “is better it than not it”? - as is true of ‘being wise’. And Augustine On the Trinity XV ch.4 n.6: “In the volumes of the divine books authority only preaches that God is, but all of nature around us proclaims that he is the best and most outstanding Creator, who has given us mind, by which we judge that living things are to be preferred to non-living, things endowed with sense to things without, and intelligent things to non-intelligent ones, and incorruptible things to corruptible; and because of this, since we without doubt prefer the Creator to the things created, we must confess that he both supremely lives, and understands all things, and is most just, best, and most blessed,     etc .;” see Augustine there. - What would that consequence be if natural reason says that to be blessed is better than to be miserable, therefore      God is blessed (if what ‘it’ is in creatures is better than its opposite, this is because of its reality), and in God from the nature of the thing this reality is in some way there but only in its foundation, with the opposite mode of this sort of formality

68. But that this intellect - which is proved to exist there from the nature of the thing [nn.64-67] - is infinite the proof is:

For, as intellect formally, it understands the divine essence as object; nothing comprehends an object formally infinite unless what comprehends it is formally infinite;     therefore etc     .

69. Further, the divine intellect as intellect understands infinite intelligibles at the same time - according to Augustine City of God XII ch.18: “Is it really the case that God does not know the numbers because of their infinity? Who, even a complete madman, would say this?” and he adds: “The infinity then of numbers, although there is no number of infinite numbers, is yet not incomprehensible to that intellect of which there is no number [Psalm 146.5].”

70. And if you say [another instance against n.63] that the intellect is not formally infinite insofar as it is intellect but insofar as it is the same as the divine infinite essence, and therefore it does not, insofar as it is intellect, have that whereby it is the productive principle of another infinite person, and so there will not be five divine persons [n.63], -against this I argue that in this way one could say that paternity is formally infinite because it is the same as the infinite divine essence, and then it would not be more discordant for the Son not to be simply intelligent than for him not to be formally Father, which is manifestly absurd.

71. There is proof also from another point, that things which are not formally infinite in divine reality, if they are taken in the abstract, are not predicated of each other, not even by identity just as not formally either; hence this proposition is not conceded ‘paternity is the property of not being born’. The reason for this was stated in distinction 8 in the question ‘About the attributes’ [I d.8 nn.219, 221], because ‘abstraction takes away that which was the cause of truth’, namely the identity of the extremes, - because, as precisely taken, ‘neither is formally infinite, and therefore neither as taken precisely abstractly includes its being the same as the other’. But this proposition is true ‘intellect is paternity’ and ‘intellect is filiation’, although there is not there formal predication; therefore the intellect has formal infinity, of the sort that filiation and paternity and the property of not being born do not have.

72. And if you ask, is the intellect altogether infinite from itself as the essence is? - I reply:

It can be said that, just as by distinguishing things from each other, one thing is infinite from itself and in itself (as the first person in divine reality), another thing is infinite in itself but not from itself (as the Son and the Holy Spirit), but another thing is finite from itself and is likewise finite in itself (as is the creature), - so, by considering things which are not formally the same, something can be taken as infinite in itself and altogether from itself, as the divine essence, which is the root and foundation, which has its infinity from nothing; hence according to John Damascene On the Orthodox Faith ch.9, the being of God is like “a certain infinite sea of the infinite substance of God [I d.8 nn.199-202];” but something is infinite through itself and in itself but not altogether from itself as first root and foundation of all infinity, as the divine attributes, which according to John Damascene ibid. ch.4 state something that concerns the essence - and well can such things be posited as formally infinite in themselves and through themselves, but radically in the essence as in the foundation with which they are identical; further, something is what is neither in itself formally infinite nor formally the same as the infinite, as the personal properties.

73. But what is the reason why these do not have formal infinity from the essence, as the intellect has?An empty space is left here by Scotus; the question is unanswered in the Ordinatio. ⁹

74. To the arguments for this finally rejected opinion [nn.45-46, 63-72].

When it is said that ‘the infinite from itself, altogether indistinct, can be the principle of distinct things’ [n.43], this is true when the distinct things do not from their own idea require a prior distinction in principles; but such a prior distinction is required by free production and natural production, because there cannot be a distinction first for such distinct things but there is pre-required some distinction in the principles, which in some way have to be principles naturally and freely of the divine persons.

75. Again, if the essence is per impossibile posited - as it is understood - to be the foundation of the perfections [n.72], and it is not understood to be intellective or volitional, nor consequently to be source of saying nor of inspiriting - could it really be a principle of communicating itself?

76. And from this [n.74] is plain the response to the confirmation adduced there [n.44]. The fact that the essence has wisdom and goodness and all the other perfect attributes before all consideration of the intellect, and this without any distinction presupposed in the essence, is true because those perfect attributes do not require an opposite mode of coming from a principle nor a distinction in the principles; for the essence is will as naturally as it is intellect; likewise these attributes do not properly come from the essence as from a principle, although the essence be conceded in some way to have the idea of radical and foundational perfection with respect to them [nn.72, 44].

II. Scotus’ own Opinion

77. To the question [n.1] I respond that the productions are distinguished formally by themselves. For generation is itself formally generation, and inspiriting is itself formally inspiriting, and from their formal reasons it is impossible for generation to be inspiriting (when everything else is per impossibile removed), such that it is not necessary to ask by what they are distinguished [n.7], because the whole formal reason of one is not the same as the whole formal reason of the other.

78. This is clear through Augustine On the Trinity XV ch.27 n.5, where he says that “thus you will see how or what distance there is between the nativity of the Word and the procession of the Gift;” and a little later that: “the will proceeds from cognition, but it is not the image of cognition; and therefore in this matter he who can sees and discerns a certain intelligible distance between procession and nativity (since to descry a thing by knowledge is not to desire it, nor even to enjoy it by will),” - where from the distinction of the processions he wants to deduce a distinction of persons proceeding.

79. Likewise in ibid. V ch.14 n.5: “Where too this shines forth why the Holy Spirit is also not a son, although he too exits from the Father; and for this reason is he not called a son, because neither is he born; for he exited from the Father not as somehow born but as somehow given.” Therefore he solved there the question about the distinction of persons through their distinct emanations.

80. And if it be objected that ‘the emanations are not from themselves, therefore they are not distinguished by themselves’ (the proof of the consequence is that from what something has entity, from that it also has unity, Metaphysics 2.1.993a30-31), - because being and one are said to be convertible), I reply:

Specific differences are not effectively from themselves and yet they are by themselves formally distinct, but they are effectively distinct by that from which they effectively are. But to be distinguished ‘first formally’ is not to be distinguished by something included in one thing, and agreeing with another thing [sc. as Socrates is distinguished from Plato by socrateity and agrees with Plato in humanity], but to be distinguished itself in its totality formally, even if per impossibile everything other than its idea is excluded; thus I say that if ultimate differences were composite, they would be distinguished themselves in their totality and would be themselves in their totality distinct first formally.

So I say in the proposed case, that if per impossibile these distinct persons could exist without a principle, they would themselves in their totality be formally distinct, such that nothing formally included in one would be formally included in the other; and yet, as they do have principles, so are they in their having principles or in their having an origin distinct from their principles (namely from intellect and will), which are not only distinct by reason, as was argued against the penultimate opinion [nn.31-40]. But the intellect is from the nature of the thing not formally will and, since infinity added to something does not destroy its formal idea, infinite intellect is not formally infinite will; and so, although it would not be necessary for this formal distinction [sc. of emanations] to be reduced to another distinction [sc. of principles] insofar as it is formal, yet because it is formal and is in things that have a principle, it is reduced to this distinction of principles.

81. If it be said that although two things are distinguished from three, yet two infinite things are not distinguished from three infinite things, - on the contrary.Scotus added nothing here but left a blank space. ¹⁰

III. To the Principal Arguments

82. To the principal arguments [nn.1-5].

To the first [n.1] I say that it seems to conclude against those who posit that the quasi-subject of generation is the divine essence, for since generation in creatures is natural from the inclination of the passive principle, but not from the reason of the active principle (because if my will were to generate fire from the matter, the passive generation would be natural because of the inclination of the passive power to the form, although the active principle would be free), so it seems that, if the divine essence were the quasisubject in divine reality with respect to the personal properties - since the essence as naturally inclines to the property of the Holy Spirit as to the property of the Son -, the passive production of the Holy Spirit would be as natural as that of the Son, although this production and that would be from a different productive principle; but it does not conclude against me, because I deny generation there under the idea of change, and deny altogether anything passive with respect to act (as is clear in distinction 5 nn.97, 113, 118, 131-132, 137-138), but I posit there precisely generation under the idea of production, whose terms are the producer and the produced; so there precisely will generation be called natural, because the relation between producer and produced is natural, and the naturalness of this sort of relation is on the part of the naturalness of the producer itself, because it produces by a principle naturally inclining to act, - and the Father does not inspirit in this way. Alternatively it is said that generation is in one way taken for the generation of substance, or in another way specifically for the production of the living from the living (and in this way is an animal said to be generated but not fire), and in this latter way there commonly concurs on the part of the agent a natural inclination or a natural form, which is the principle of generating; and it is in this latter way that generation in divine reality seems to exist. - The first response [earlier in his paragraph] is better, perhaps.

83. To the second [n.2] I say that, when two things are compared to an unlimited or indeterminate third thing, the union of them among themselves does not follow from their union in the third thing. An example: ‘if I am with God here and the Pope is with God in Rome, therefore I am together with the Pope’ does not follow, because God is unlimited as to the presence by which he is present at places; so too it does not follow that ‘I am with eternity, and Abraham was with eternity, therefore I am together with Abraham’, because God is eternal and his eternity is unlimited. So do I say in the intended proposition that the Father has in himself a double fecundity perfectly, but each production corresponds precisely to one fecundity; and therefore the Father is, with respect to the two productions, a sort of thing unlimited, or as it were indeterminate, as compared to determinate things, - and therefore it does not follow that, if both productions are univocal with such an unlimited third thing, these productions are univocal among themselves.

84. Against this there is an argument as follows:

If the productions are not univocal but are of different ideas, therefore the terms too will be of different ideas, - from the Physics [n.1]; but if the produced terms require such a formal distinction, the terms will not be univocal to some third thing; therefore from the opposite, if the terms are univocal to some third thing, the productions too will be univocal among themselves.

85. Further, the intellect and will, insofar as they are operative powers, require a formal distinction in their objects, and if they were, in respect of their objects, productive powers, they would produce such a distinction in their objects;     therefore , since the produced terms require such a formal distinction, the terms will not be univocal [sc. to some third thing].

86. Further, what is produced through the intellect is, from the force of its production, generated knowledge, while what is produced through the mode of will is proceeding love; but knowledge as knowledge and love as love seem to be of formally different ideas; therefore etc     .

87. To the first [n.84] I say that the proposition about motions and terms - which is adduced for the intended proposition - is only true when two other propositions are true, namely that ‘the form in flux, according to which there is motion, is of the same idea as the terminating form’ [n.11], and ‘motion is of the same idea as the form in flux’ [I d.2 n.339]. Now applying this to the proposition, there is no flux nor a form in flux, but this production is not of the same idea as the form which is the formal term of production, because the formal term of the production is something essential, but the production is formally a relation; and therefore one should not conclude from a distinction of productions to a formal distinction of objects or terms. An example of what has been said about motions is plain from the Physics 5.4.227b14-18, because the same ‘where’ can be acquired by motion in a straight line or circular motion, which are altogether of a different species, as is proved in Physics 7.4.248a10-13, 248b4-6 “because they are not comparable.” But in this case the form according to which there is flux in the form of motion, if it is of the same idea as the term, is not for this reason distinctive of the idea of motions. - This response was touched on above in distinction 2 in the question ‘On productions’ [I d.2 n.339], for the argument of the Commentator [ibid., n.212].

88. And if you object that at least the first terms, namely the formal terms, will not be univocal, whereby the productions are not univocal, and so the persons - which are the first terms - will not be univocal among themselves, and so they will not be univocal in a third thing, - I respond:

Production does not formally include the divine essence, but the person does formally include it, because the person is not only a property or a relation but a hypostasis subsisting in the divine nature, - just as Socrates does not only include the individual property but also human nature. Although, therefore, the first terms are of the same idea as the productions as to the fact that the first terms include the relations (because the productions are relations), yet they are not of the same idea quasi-adequately, because the first terms do not only include the relations but also the absolute reality; and then the persons must not only be distinguished as the productions are distinguished, because what includes certain distinguishing things must not only be distinguished as the distinguishing things are (as was said above in distinction 8 in the question ‘Whether God is in a genus’ n.106), because the differences are primarily diverse, but the things that primarily include them are not primarily diverse.

89. To the other point, about powers [n.85], I say that as they are operative powers they do not require a distinct formal object. Rather, the same thing that is the first object of the divine intellect is also the first and formal object of the divine will, such that each power is beatified in the same first object, according to the same formal idea of the first object. For no perfection quasi-founded in the divine essence is primarily beatific of the divine intellect or the divine will, but the essence is, under any sort of first idea (namely as it is the foundation of every perfection in divine reality), such that the argument is to the opposite, because just as there is not also required a formal distinction in the objects as they are operative powers, so neither in the products as they are productive.

90. To the third argument [n.86] I say that it is not to the purpose, because those who hold that generation in divine reality is equivocal in itself say that it is in itself equivocal because of the equivocation of the produced term with the producer, - and likewise, they have to say that inspiriting is in itself equivocal because of the difference of the inspirited from the inspiriter. This conclusion therefore would not be sufficient for them, that the generated and the inspirited are equivocal. - But the argument in itself, if it proves anything, only proves a distinction of the generated and inspirited or of the formal terms of generation and inspiriting, - and so not their intended proposition.

91. But on the contrary I argue as follows: it can be said that the assumption, namely that ‘the generated, from the force of its production - namely of its generation -is actual knowledge’ [n.86] can be distinguished about the primacy of origin and about the primacy of adequacy. If it is understood about the primacy of origin, it can be denied, because then the three persons would not be uniformly God; for in the Father deity is understood to be in him a quasi-principle and foundation of any perfection, and then, if knowledge is pre-understood in the Son before the essence, the Son would not have essence before anything else in himself but would have knowledge, and so he would not be God uniformly with the Father.

93. As to this primacy, then, although it is not one of origin, yet it does correspond to the primacy of origin of several perfections in one creature; and it can be said that the first thing in any person is the essence, because when something contains in itself many communicable perfections, when it communicates that one first thing, it communicates all the perfections in the order in which they are of a nature to be in that one thing. An example, both in the distinction of things and in the distinction of nonthings (though on the part of the thing): first indeed - if fire were to generate the whole fire and were to produce both the matter and the form, it would communicate the matter first in origin before it communicated the form (in the order namely in which these are in the generator); an example of the second is - fire is a corporeal and inanimate substance and element. Just as these then exist in order in the generating fire, so they are communicated in a like order to the generated fire, and yet the first term in adequacy is fire as it is fire, because this is what is principally intended by the generating fire and in which the generated fire (namely fire as fire) is most perfectly made like it. So can it be said in the proposed case, that although the divine essence in any person is altogether first, a quasi-foundation of any essential perfection, - the first person, however, has memory appropriately, and by virtue of that productive principle it produces adequately with a first production the second person, and the second person quasi-adequately by its own productive principle produces as it is actual knowledge, and the Holy Spirit, being quasi-adequate to this own productive principle, is produced as actual love.

94. But then the argument [n.91] still seems to stand, because equivocation or non-univocation seem to be proved more from the primacy of adequacy than from the primacy of origin; for although the sun is a substance and a worm is a substance, yet not for this reason is there univocal generation of a worm by the sun, because the sun does not assimilate the term to itself in its specific form; so therefore there seems to be equivocation here, from which the first adequate produced term is not altogether univocally of the same idea as the productive principle.

95. I say that there is not equivocal production if the productive principle is not of the same idea as the produced formal term - speaking of the first productive principle and of the first produced formal term - but there is required that that which is the productive principle not be of the same idea in the generated thing, nor that that which is the form term in the product be of the same idea in the producer; but the opposite of this is in the intended proposition, because memory is both formally in actual generated knowledge, and actual knowledge is formally in the generating person, although neither of these is the first reason of acting and the first reason of terminating the production. An example of this is: if an ass generates an ass, although the specific form is the first principle of producing, the generation is not for this reason equivocal or non-univocal, because that which is the per se formal term of generation is also of the same idea in the generator, although it is not for it the idea of generating; but that something of the same idea is first in this (as in the producer) or first in that (as in the produced term) is not required for univocal generation. Thus can be posited an example about animate flesh, generating animate flesh naturally by the virtue of heat, where however the soul itself - or whatever other form be granted - is not necessarily the first principle of producing and the first formal term in the product; therefore this is not required for univocity of generation.

96. To the second principal argumentThe second principal argument [n.2] was in fact responded to already [n.83]; the argument responded to here is only found in the Lectura I d.13 n.4. ¹¹ I say that active generation and active inspiriting are the formally the same, nor are the first formal terms of them (namely actual knowledge and actual love) formally the same; yet the first terms, produced by these productions, are both univocal among themselves and the producer, because the produced persons have the same absolute perfection, both with each other and with the producer.

97. To the other I say that the antecedent ‘about the distinction of principles by reason alone’ is false [nn.64-67].

98. To the first proof, when it is argued that ‘the opposite would not stand with the divine simplicity’, the response was given often before in distinctions 2 and 8 [nn.191-127, 388-410], where mention was made about formal non-identity without real distinction.

99. To the second proof, when it is argued ‘otherwise there would be a real relation between intellect and understanding’ [n.6], I reply that the intellect is both an operative power and a productive power; but insofar as it is an operative power, neither the intellect, nor the supposit of which it is the operation, has a real relation to real operation, but this happens in us, because in us there is a real difference between the intellect and the operation for which it is; but as it is a productive principle, although it does not have a real relation to the product (because it is the same as the product), nor to the production (for the same reason), yet the producer itself has a real relation to the product, and this is enough for the production to be real. But such relation is not required between the intellect and understanding, because there is no real distinction between this and that; nor does the fact that the intellect is for the Father the principle for understanding indicate a real relation of the intellect itself to the intellection that is in the Father himself according to the principle, because this is seen more in the case of generation than of intellection (because generation requires a greater distinction), yet neither when it is said that ‘the intellect is for the Father the principle of saying’ is a real relation indicated between the intellect and saying.

100. And when it is argued that ‘he would not understand more with the intellect than with the will’ [n.4] the consequence is not valid. Nor does ‘to understand with the intellect’ indicate that there is a real relation of the intellect or of the Father according to the intellect to understanding, but only that this is some operative perfection, according to which such operation belongs to the Father, - nor does it follow that ‘he does not understand more with the intellect than with the will’, because this operation which is to understand is of a nature to belong first to the intellect and is not thus of a nature to belong to the will, nor is there any other reason save that the intellect is intellect and the will is will; for to any operative principle, from the fact that it is such, whether it is a per se thing or is contained unitively in something, its proper operation is of a nature to belong.

101. On the contrary: it is conceded that in the Father the intellect is for him the principle of understanding; to be principle implies some relation, and if it is principle from the nature of the thing, it will be a relation from the nature of the thing, and consequently it will be a real relation.

Response: whatever would really belong to something - if it were a thing -, this same thing should belong to it (and not to another) when it is a reason or in accord with reason; in this way is there intellect in the Father in respect of understanding, because the principle is altogether the same as understanding, really.

102. To the other proof - about unequals and about adding the same thing - that the first consequence should still hold, in the proposed case [n.5], I reply:

Just as in consequences it is said that, when the same thing is added, if the consequence holds, it will still hold (this is true, when the same added thing does not destroy the idea of the consequence, as when it is said ‘man, therefore animal, - every man, therefore every animal’) with respect to any predicate, or conversely negatively, -so in the intended proposition I say that the inequality of intellection and intellect is because of the limitation of the extremes, because of which (or without which not) the one exceeds the other; but when an infinite thing is added to both extremes, it takes away limitation, and so inequality, from both extremes, - and then it does not follow that they are unequal, nay infinite intellect and ‘infinite understanding’ are of equal perfection.

103. And if it is objected against this that infinity does not take away all inequality, because infinite whiteness would exceed infinite blackness, - I say that infinity added to something of itself limited is infinity in a certain respect (of the sort that can belong to the idea of such a limited thing), because it does not state infinity or illimitation save in the idea of that to which it is added, which in this case cannot be simply infinite; but infinity added to some perfection simply (namely to which infinity simply is not repugnant), there is infinity in that idea, and so infinity simply. But understanding and intellect are formally ‘perfections simply’, and do not involve limitation, - and therefore infinity added to each states infinity simply; not only in these ideas but also concomitantly in being and truth and goodness, and in every perfection simply, because all ‘perfections simply’ mutually and unitively include each other; and therefore ‘infinite understanding’ is simply equal to infinite intellect.